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THERE IS NO AREA of congressional decision-making about which 
there is less academic consensus than there is a bout the conference 
committee. The major studies-by Fenno,1 Manley,2 Steiner,3 and 
Vogler'-have come to disparate conclusions which, at least on the 
surface, seem difficult to reconcile with each other. Each of these 
studies poses the question, "Who wins in conference, the House or 
the Senate?'' To settle the question, each develops his own measure 
of who wins. Briefly, Steiner found that in his sample of conference 
decisions, the House generally prevails. Fenno and Vogler each 
discovered a pattern of Senate dominance. Fenno worked only with 
appropriations conferences while Vogler assembled a much broader 
sample of legislative as well as appropriations conferences. Manley 
found that, among conferences between Ways and Means and the 
Senate Finance Committee, the Senate prevailed on certain issues 
(revenues, trade), while the House dominated on social security 
legislation. 
For several reasons these findings should not be accepted as they 
1 Richard Fermo, The Power af the Purse ( Boston: Little-Brown, 1966). 
2 John Manley, The Politics of Finance ( Boston: Little-Brown, 1970). 
3 Gilbert Steiner, The Congressional Conference Committee (Urbana, Univer­
sity of Illinois Press, 1951). 
4 David Vogler, "Patterns of One House Dominance in Congressional Con­
ference Committees," Midwestern Journal of Political Science 14 (1970), 303-
320. 
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stand. First, Fenno presents a wealth of evidence and personal 
observation which could lead one to believe that the House was the 
more potent force in conference. The House conferees are better 
prepared, better organized, and generally seem to care more about 
the legislation. Moreover, many of them, and their Senate counter­
parts, too, think they are relatively more successful in conference 
than the Senate. Manley discounts Fenno's interview evidence on 
this point as a bit tainted by a natural disposition of the House 
conferees to overestimate their effectiveness, but his observations, 
too, generally support the view that the House possesses the pre­
ponderance of advantages in the conference. 
To be sure, Fenno and Manley each offer reasonable explanations 
for their findings. Fenno appealed to two closely related factors. 
( 1) The Senate conferees' goals were more congruent with the 
goals of other Senators than the goals of House conferees were with 
the goals of other House members. 
( 2) Many House members were more in sympathy with the 
Senate position than they were with the position of the House Ap­
propriations Committee. 
Manley suggested that the pattern of Senate dominance in certain 
areas may be attributable to the fact that the Senate position enjoys 
more support of the active lobbying groups than does the House 
position. 
In this note I shall suggest a different explanation of Fenno's 
and Manley's results which seems to work well for a somewhat more 
restricted set of data than is found in the other studies. When 
applied to a broader set of data, such a theory may help resolve the 
paradoxical results of these earlier works. 
The present study is based on the idea that the models used by 
other authors to analyze the conference implicitly postulate a kind 
of conflict between the House and Senate that seems uncharacter­
istic of such conference decision-making. The model introduced 
here is close in spirit to Manley's observation. 
The overriding ethic of the Conference Committee is one of bargaining, give­
and-take, compromise, horse-trading, conciliation, and malleability by all con­
cerned . .. compromise is the candid rule of conference committees. Small 
wonder that each side claims victory, because almost everyone does win­
something, somehow, sometime,5 
5 Manley, Politics of Finance, 271. 
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I shall attempt to demonstrate that recognition of the cooperative 
behavior between the House and Senate conferees can lead to a 
much different interpretation of data on conference decision-making. 
METHODS 
To study conference outcomes, each of the studies mentioned first 
identified the House and Senate positions on the bill (or in Manley's 
study, on sections of a bill). Then each found the conference posi­
tion and determined whether it was "closer" to the House or Senate 
version. In most cases, these positions were measured in dollars, 
but various modifications �'2re present in some of the studies. The 
basic idea behind this method is the assumption that each chamber 
employs its own judgment to determine just the sort of final legisla­
tion it would like to see. It then codifies this into its bill through 
its own internal decision procedures. 
This assumption seems questionable on the basis of evidence 
presented in some of the studies being examined. Fenno gives 
evidence to suggest that the Senate bill may sometimes contain a 
bit larger appropriation than the Senate would like to see since they 
expect to have to accede somewhat to the House in the conference. 
By the same token, Senators seem to believe that the House bill is 
not an accurate record of what the House actually wants. "The 
dominant image which the Senate [Appropriations] Committee 
members have of the House is that the House deliberately reduces 
budget estimates below what it knows is reasonable in order to get 
the credit for economy action.' These remarks indicate that the 
time sequencing of the decision-making processes induces the actors 
to make moves at various stages which are strategic rather than 
direct expressions of their real goals. Taking these strategic an­
nouncements at face value in computing a measure of House or 
Senate "dominance in conference" seems to be asking for trouble. 
To avoid this pitfall, let us note that conferees might be supposed 
to make decisions in at least two distinct ways. The first model is 
based on the assumption that each chamber recommends the bill it 
would most like to see. The conferees then confront each other 
item by item and hammer out a report that strikes a balance be­
tween the two bills. One might expect that in such a process, a 
dominant mode of conflict resolution on bills characterized by dollar 
6 Fenno, Power of the Purse, 538. 
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figures (like appropriations bills) would be "splitting the differ-
ence." 
A second model of the conference asserts that each chamber is 
interested in different (though possibly overlapping) sections of 
the bill. In this case many of the changes made in one house might 
stand unmodified by the other, though the areas of overlapping 
interest would contain items about which the two chambers dis­
agreed. The conferees would then just accept the recommenda­
tions of the House and Senate on the parts of the bill where only 
one of the two houses manifested interest. For those items where 
the chambers disagreed, a "split-the-difference" method of concilia­
tion might be employed in the conference. 
Decision-making on the appropriations bill containing the Army 
Corps of Engineers budget over a period from 1951 to 1967 offers 
an opportunity to examine decision-making procedures which might 
be consistent with either of the two proposed models.' By the 
characterizations of the two models given here, the more the two 
chambers manifest interest in the same items of the bill, the more 
prevalent split-the-difference decision-making in conference should 
be. Figure 1 presents a measure of the overlap in manifested in­
terest in the Corps of Engineers budget between the House and 
Senate and an indication of how frequently a split-the-difference 
7 The statistical data in this study is from the following sources: U.S. 
Congress, House, House Appropriation-; Committee, Conference Reports of 
the Public Works Subcommittee for FY 1956 to FY 1968, 84th Cong., 1st 
sess. to 90th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office). U.S. Congress, House, House Appropriations Committee, Public 
Works Subcommittee, Reports on Public Works Appropriations for FY 1956 
to FY 1968, 84th Cong., 1st sess. to 90th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office). U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Appropriations 
Committee, Public Works Subcommittee, Reports on Public Works Appropria­
tions for FY 1956 to FY 1968, 84th Cong., 1st sess. to 90th Cong., 1st sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). U.S. Congress, House, 
House Appropriations Committee, Reports, Civil Functions Appropriations for 
the Department of the Anny for FY 1952 to FY 1955, 81st Cong., 1st sess. to 
83rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Congress, House, House Appropriations Committee Conference Reports, 
Civil Functions Appropriations for the Department of the Army for FY 1952 
to FY 1955, 8Ist Cong., 1st sess. to 83rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office). U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Appro­
priations Committee, Reports Civil Functions Appropriations for the Depart­
ment of the Army for FY 1952 to FY 1955, 8lst Cong., 1st sess. to 83rd Cong., 
2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). 
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OVERLAPPING INTEREST AND SPLITTING-THE-DIFFERENCE IN CONFERENCE 
/, % of items with 
11 ', overlapping interest 
I ' 
I 'o e .... -... 
' 
' 
' 
\ 
difference 
' 
I 
' 
' 
• 
,, 
' I ' 
' I \ 
' , \ 
I I \ 
I ' 
I 
I 
I f 
·---
• • ,, ,, I \ I \ I \ I \ 
J \ I \ 
J \ I \ ' ' I 
\ I \ I 
,, •..... ,' . -. 
' 
\ 
\ 
• ' 
• 
' I ' I 
' , 
•---. 
I 
' I ' I 
', 
, 
''· 
'J I I I I 1 1  I I I I I I I I 1-4 
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 
Year 
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 
1038 THE JOlIBNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 37, 1975 
decision-making in conference should be. Figure 1 presents a mea­
sure of the overlap in manifested interest in the Corps of Engineers 
budget between the House and Senate and an indication of how fre­
quently a split-the-difference procedure was employed by con­
ferees. The overlap measure is simply the ratio of the number of 
projects that both chambers changed (i.e., the number of projects in 
which the House modified the budget figure and the Senate changed 
the House figure, or, in which the Senate changed the budget figure 
and the conference changed the Senate figure) over the total num­
ber of projects upon which either chamber modified the budget esti­
mate. The split-the-difference measure is the ratio of the number 
of times the conferees chose a final figure on an item between the 
House and Senate figures over the total number of items in disagree­
ment. The correlation between these two series was .63 (t�3.2) . 
It's worth noticing for purposes of comparing the two models that 
there appears to have been a noticeable difference in both over­
lapping interest and split-the-difference decision-making between 
the 1951-1954 period and the 1955-1967 period. 
In order to decide «who wins" in conference, it is necessary to 
introduce a definition of what it means to "win" in this situation. 
Not surprisingly, considering the already remarked tendency for the 
chambers to produce bills that are out of line with what each 
actually prefers, the notion of "who wins" depends on which theory 
of conference decision-making is accepted. But first, some assump­
tions are necessary about the actual desires of the House and Senate 
on the Corps budget: 
( 1) Both bodies are interested in adding certain projects to the 
President's budget. 
( 2) Only the House has any interest in cutting the budget.' 
( 3) The Senate acts an as "appeals-court" for agents who are 
dissatisfied with House or Budget Bureau decisions. 
The House is successful in conference to the extent that it can 
get the new projects it puts into the budget approved in conference, 
sustain the cuts it makes in the President's budget, and restrains 
8 In principal there is no reason that the Senate might not take an interest 
in cutting appropriations after the House has completed its work. For reasons 
admirably summarized in Fenno's book, this behavior is extremely uncommon 
and so I choose not to complicate the model to include it as a possibility. 
One could modify the model to allow this sort of behavior, further complicating 
in the process the problem of deciding who wins in conference. 
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the inclusion of new Senate projects. The Senate is successful in 
conference if it can keep its new projects in the conference report 
and successfully restore some of the House cuts in the budget. The 
relative success of the two bodies is therefore partly (not totally) 
in conflict. The question of "who wins" in this model translates into 
"which body does better in attaining its goals." 
One of course must be prepared to accept the possibility of an 
ambiguous answer, since each body is presumed to have more than 
one goal and since those goals are not wholly in conflict. The 
House may retain most of its new starts in conference but not be 
able to sustain many budget cuts. The Senate may be relatively 
unsuccessful at retaining new starts but still be able to restore most 
budget cuts made in the House. In such a case, the question of 
who does better is basically unresolved. I am willing to accept 
such a possibility. After all, a single-valued measure of "domi­
nance" may assure us of answering the "who wins" question as 
posed, but it may also lead us to produce a judgment where, in 
truth, no grounds for such a judgment exist. 
A MODEL 
In this section 've present a simple model of decision-making in 
the House, Senate and conference committees on appropriations for 
the Corps of Engineers. The central idea is to show that once an 
explicit model of decision-making is introduced, a somewhat dif­
ferent interpretation of the data on conference outcomes than is 
proposed by previous authors becomes plausible. Once the model 
is set out it is possible to obtain estimates of its parameters in order 
to determine an answer to the question "who wins?'� 
Let H, be the total number of changes in the budget figure by 
the House. H, can be decomposed into the number of upward 
changes ( U ,H) and the number of downward changes ( D,). The 
number of Senate changes in the budget request is composed of 
all the upward changes by the House (U,H), all the upward 
changes by the Senate (U,8), plus the number of the downward 
changes by the House which the Senate did not restore ( (I - a) D,) 
where a is the proportion of downward changes by the House that 
the Senate restores. The number of disagreements between the 
bills is the sum 
u,s+aD,. 
The conference, according to the proposed decision rule, accepts 
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some proportion ( b) of all the Senate changes and (let us say) one 
half of the real disagreements ( aD,). Thus, the conference out­
come is 
1 
bu,s+ -aD, 
2 
and b is very close to one, indicating that the House accepts nearly 
all the Senate's proposed upward changes just as the Senate ac­
cepted all the House's. With these parameter values the House 
would seem to be more influential than the Senate in conference if 
b is less than 1.0, but the Fenno-Vogler method of measuring vic­
tories would give 
l bu,s+-aD, 
2 
Senate victories. In percentages the Senate success would be 
u,s+an, 
It may be enlightening to see how the enate success ratio behaves 
when certain plausible parameter and data values are chosen. For 
expositional purposes we give some reasonable estimates for each 
of these parameters: 
2 a=-
3 
b�.9 
approximate number of upward 
change in the budget by the 
Senate 
approximate number of downward 
changes by the House 
proportion of Senate revisions of 
House downward changes 
House acceptance of Senate up­
ward changes in conference 
These ranges of estimates were obtained by consideration of the 
stage-by-stage budget data over the period under study. Under 
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the model postulated here the estimates for Senate success ratio 
used by Fenno and Vogler range from .74 to .84 even though as 
the model is set up, the House is slightly more influential since it 
does not accept all of the upward changes the Senate recommends 
although the Senate accepts all the upward changes the House 
allows. 
Casual observation indicated that the a parameter (the propor­
tion of House deletions that the Senate restores) seemed quite 
stable, while the b parameter (the proportion of Senate upward 
changes that the House accepts in conference) appears to vary a 
good deal from year to year. If one wants to explain the observed 
results of Fenno and Vogler-that the Senate wins 65 percent of 
the time-by use of this model it would be most plausible to permit 
b to vary while fixing a at its average level. It should be remem­
bered that as b gets smaller the House is, in effect, getting more 
powerful. Estimates of b in the range .5 to . 7 give outcomes of 
Senate "wins" around 65 percent of the time depending on U ,s and 
D, in each year. The "real" estimate of influence in this model is 
reflected in the parameter b and in it the House is the more per­
suasive body since it retains all of the new starts it desires but only 
yields to the Senate on lOOXb percent of its starts. 
The data utilized here is at the project level, unlike the data em­
ployed by Fenno and Vogler. The same model may work for bills 
rather than projects with little modification by allowing UH, U8, 
and D to refer to dollar amounts and leaving a and b with the 
same interpretation. The point is that the results obtained by 
Fenno, which clash with his own observations and interview data, 
and for which he provided an ad hoc explanation, may be mislead­
ing and the result of logrolling between the House and Senate con­
ferees, combined with the fact that the House always makes its de­
cisions prior to the Senate. 
The data employed in this paper can be used to argue that the 
I-louse is dominant in the conference. For example, we may con­
sider the probability that a new start project gets accepted by the 
conference given that it is initiated by the House or the Senate. 
For 1967, 95 percent of the projects initiated by the House were 
put in the conference bill. For the same year, if the Senate initiated 
a project it had only a .70 percent change of being included in the 
budget. If the House, on the other hand, wished to cut a budget 
figure, it was successful with probability .85. Apparently the 
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House was much the more potent body in 1967, yet the Senate 
success ratio for the year is .495-reflecting only slight House domi­
nance. 
By this measure the conference outcomes are generally domi­
nated by the House, a pattern illustrated by the data in Table 1. 
Year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
TABLE 1 
PROPORTION OF NEW STARTS INITIATED BY THE HousE AND SENATE 
WHICH ARE FUNDED IN THE CONFERENCE BUDGET 
Proportion of Proportion_ of 
House New Senate New 
Starts Funded Starts Funded 
• 1.00 
• .33 
1.00 .64 
• .58 
1.00 .91 
1.00 .91 
1.00 .65 
.98 .79 
1.00 .63 
.96 .72 
1.00 .77 
.94 -0-
1.00 .80 
.97 .84 
1.00 .82 
1.00 .83 
.98 .70 
i/I; indicates that no new starts were initiated. 
If the House adds a new start to the Corps' budget, then it is almost 
always funded in the final budget. A Senate-initiated new start 
usually has a much smaller chance of remaining in the conference 
budget. The House's superiority in the conference in obtaining new 
starts seems to stem from the fact that it is a bottleneck. House 
approval of a new project generally implies Senate approval but 
the converse is not the case. 
How successful is the House in cutting the Corps' budget? Over 
the 17-year period frorn 1951to1967, the House has reduced budget 
requests on projects 452 times. The conference accepted a reduc­
tion either equal to the House figure, or, if the Senate rnade a resto-
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ration, closer to the House figure than to the Senate figure about 
60 percent of the time. On the cursory analysis one must lean to 
the interpretation that not only is the House more successful than 
the Senate in getting its way on new starts, it is also fairly successful 
at reducing budget estimates on the projects in which it shows an 
interest. 
A somewhat more precise impression can be obtained through 
estimating the parameters ( a,b) in the model. Additionally, an 
estimate will be provided of the proportion ( c) of Senate restora­
tions of House cuts ( aD,) which are accepted in the conference. 
The model estimated here is as follows: S, is the number of Senate 
revisions of House cuts and Ct is the number of times the confer­
ence adopts a figure closer to the Senate figure than to that of the 
House on items which the House cut and the Senate restored. P, 
is the number of times the conference accepted a figure closer to the 
Senate than the House on items on which the Senate initiated an 
upward change. The following model was employed: 
St=aDt+e1 
P,=bU,8+e, 
Ct=CSt+es 
Regression estimates were obtained for these parameters and are 
given here: 
a=.77 
b=.76 
c=.52 
R'=.97 
R'=.86 
R'=.82 
The Senate revises about 77 percent of the House cuts and the 
conference ends up closer to the Senate figure 52 percent of the 
time. However, the Senate allows House reductions to go unchal­
lenged 23 percent of the time and this accounts for the phenomenon 
of 60 percent House success on the items on which it chooses to 
cut the budget estimate. 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the previous section gives reason to believe that 
with respect to Corps of Engineers appropriations the House does 
somewhat better at getting what it wants in the conference than the 
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Senate. It gets more of its suggested new starts and has some suc­
cess at retaining the budget reductions it initiates. On the other 
hand, the Senate does manage to restore a majority of those House­
initiated reductions which it chooses to contest. Apparently on 
these items of overlapping interest, both bodies are able to obtain 
what they want most of the time. The House is successful in re­
ducing estimates on most of the projects that it cuts. The Senate is 
successful in raising funds on most of the projects that it restores. 
These results should be interpreted within the context that, ac­
cording to the traditional measure, there is a clear pattern of Senate 
victories. Of 1309 disagreements between the House and Senate 
over the period, the Senate prevailed on 859 items ( 65.5 percent). 
This figure is nearly identical to those computed by Fenno and 
Vogler. On the face of it, anyway, it would appear that the anal­
ysis carried out here may have some applicability to a reinterpreta­
tion of the findings of the other authors in this area. 
At this point it is useful to provide some interview evidence that 
the model presented here corresponds to the images held by some 
participants in these conferences.9 One House conferee character­
ized the stance of the chairman of the House subcommittee: 
EviIL5 just gets what he wants for the South. . . . He is concerned about the 
Senate getting too many projects. He is a tough guy in the conference and I 
think we get what we want most of the time. Of course the Senate is not 
going to roll over and play dead. Those Senators are always there in the 
conference at least until the stuff in their states is taken care of. The will of 
the House is carried most of the time in the conference . . .. This is because 
the Senate is spread out thinner. We get most of our members to the con­
ference and they know something about the bill. 
The same member went on to remark that Senator Ellender was 
the most powerful single member of the conferences but that his 
attention was focused on projects for Louisiana. He also pointed 
out that Senator Magnuson was usually present at conferences and 
was very successful at obtaining funding for projects in Washington 
("Maggie's monuments"). 
A staff member of the Senate Appropriations Committee who 
has been involved in these conferences for many years was asked 
for his impressions of conference decision-making. 
9 The interviews cited here were conducted by the author during the ses­
sions of 1971 and 1972. 
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Basically, the Senate agrees to the House on its new starts. They lose about 
half of our starts . . . the rest of the disagreements are just over money. 
I asked him why the House doesn't concur on Senate projects. 
Well, they try to hold down the budget over there. And, frankly, the Senate 
puts in some projects that we know are not going to get in the bill. But you 
know that the House cuts things just because they know that we are sitting 
over here and will restore a lot of that stuff. 
Several other members of the House Subcommittee were inter­
viewed (including the chief staff member) and there was essentially 
no disagreement on these points: the House and Senate are both 
interested in new starts but only the House has an interest in budget 
cutting. There was also general agreement that the House often 
did not concur with Senate requests for new projects and that the 
Senate was frequently successful in restoring House cuts. 
The interview material provides good reason for caution in in­
terpreting these findings as indications of House dominance in con­
ference. Most of those spoken to were inclined to describe the 
process as fraught with strategic behavior. Those on the Senate 
side believed the House bill was usually "unreasonable" since the 
House Appropriations subcommittee is able to cut deeply, knowing 
that the Senate will frequently restore House reductions. In other 
words, on this interpretation the House may well want the Senate 
to succeed in restoring its reductions. Also, participants from both 
the House and Senate believed that the Senate frequently adds 
"too many" new starts. These beliefs on the part of participants 
must cast. some doubt on whether the measures presented in studies 
of the conference can be unambiguously interpreted as measures 
of «who wins." Instead, the Conference Committee can more use­
fully be seen as an arena in which the two bodies try to attain 
partly incompatible goals. And to a certain extent both may he 
fairly successful. 
The findings of this study seem to me to have some important 
consequences for the strategic behavior of interest groups. If one 
were to accept Fenno's and Volger's results at face value, groups 
desiring federal expenditures would be well-advised to concentrate 
their efforts on the Senate Appropriations subcommittees. My find­
ings indicate a different strategy may be preferable. If an interest 
group wants to add a project to a bill, it should concentrate on the 
House subcommittee since a project added there will almost cer­
tainly survive the whole process. Paralleling this normative conclu-
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sion is the positive one that one ought to find a significant amount 
of lobbying to add projects taking place before the House sub­
committee. Indeed, looking at the hearings for a ten-year period, 
there is fully as much lobbying activity before the House subcom­
mittee as before the Senate subcommittee.1° 
10 See John Ferejohn's Pork Batfel Politics (Stanford: Stanford Press, 
1974). 
